We survey CFOs of public and private firms from 36 countries to examine whether and why firms from around the world altered their risk management policies when fair value reporting standards for derivatives were introduced. We document that a substantial fraction of firms (42%) state that their risk management policies have been materially affected by fair value reporting. Firms are more likely to be affected by fair value reporting if they seek to use risk management to reduce the volatility of earnings relative to cash flows and if they operate in countries with low disclosure standards. Further, firms significantly reduced the use of non-linear options contracts as a result of the regulations, but did not significantly change their use of linear derivative contracts. Finally, while most firms in our sample do not use derivatives to take active positions (speculate), those who do are more likely to be affected by fair value reporting. Taken together, our evidence shows that requirements to report derivatives at fair values have had a material impact on derivative use; while speculative activities have been reduced, sound hedging strategies have been compromised as well.
1.

Introduction
There is an extensive literature on the benefits of risk management. Risk management reduces the costs of financial distress [Smith and Stulz (1985) ], allows firms to better plan and fund profitable investment projects [Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) ], increases the tax benefits of debt financing [Stulz (1990) and Graham and Rogers (2002) ], and lowers tax payments of firms facing progressive income tax rates [Graham and Smith (1999) ]. Hedging also reduces information asymmetries between the firm and its stakeholders [Brown (2001) ], which facilitates contracting. As an example, DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) show that managing risk can reduce noise, which helps outside investors to better identify skilled managers. All these arguments imply that risk management enhances firm value.
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Risk management choices may also be influenced by managerial preferences. For instance, managers may desire smooth and stable earnings and cash flows [Tufano (1996) ]. In addition, managers may use derivatives for speculative purposes given that they can often reap large rewards for successful bets, but bear relatively few of the costs of failed bets.
In light of these costs and benefits of risk management, it is important to understand the factors behind firms' decisions to use derivatives, and, in particular, whether a factor is likely to impact risk management in ways that are beneficial or harmful to shareholders. In this paper, we study one potentially important factor, derivative reporting regulation, which has received little attention in the literature.
Specifically, we examine whether and how firms changed their risk management policies following the introduction of fair value reporting requirements for derivative securities. Under the 1 A number of papers have studied the relationship between risk management and firm value. For instance, Allayannis and Weston (2001) document that the use of currency derivatives is associated with higher firm value in the U.S.; Graham and Rogers (2002) find that hedging enhances firm value because it increases debt capacity; Bartram, Brown, and Fehle (2009) document that the use of interest rate derivatives is associated with higher firm value across a large set of countries; and Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (2010) find a positive impact of all derivative use on firm value. Jin and Jorion (2006) , however, do not find that hedging affects the value of a sample of oil and gas producers. See Stulz (2003) for an overview of the benefits of risk management and its impact on firm value. previous requirements, many derivatives were not recorded in the financial statements, nor were their prices adjusted to fair values. The current standards require firms to report derivatives at fair values in the financial statements, with any changes in value recorded in either the income statement or an equity account. As a result, these requirements have the potential to increase the volatility of both earnings and stockholders' equity. While fair values make it easier for investors to observe speculative activities involving derivatives, it is also possible that managers who want to avoid earnings and equity volatility will choose to curtail valuable hedging activities as a result of these rules. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the way in which derivatives are reported is indeed a major driving force of firms' risk management choices, but academic evidence on this area is scarce.
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To examine whether firms' hedging policies have been affected by fair value reporting requirements, we employ data from a comprehensive global survey of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) encompassing a broad range of both public and private companies from 36 countries. Using a survey to assess the factors that affect corporate risk management in an international setting has many benefits. First, it is difficult to determine using archival data whether a firm's hedging policies have actually changed as a result of fair value derivative reporting since derivative positions were often unrecorded prior to the introduction of fair value reporting. The survey asks questions relating to the standards and its consequences for risk management, which allows us to directly assess causality between changes in reporting requirements and changes in risk management practices.
Second, fair value reporting may have no effect on hedging policies but may affect firms' active positions (speculative activities). To assess the impact of fair value reporting on hedging it is therefore crucial to separate "hedgers" from "speculators". The survey used in this paper directly asks firms about their active (speculative) positions as was done for U.S. firms by Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (2007) . Geczy et al. show that identifying speculators without using such survey data is problematic. Finally, our survey approach also allows us to assess changes in the risk management policies of private companies whose financial statements are not available in many countries.
Many interesting results emerge from our analyses. First, 42% of the companies which actively engage in some form of risk management report that at least some of their risk management policies have been materially affected by the introduction of fair value reporting, and the extent to which this occurs depends on both country and firm characteristics. At the country level, risk management policies are more affected by fair value reporting if the intensity of disclosure of financial information is higher and if it is easier to prove wrongdoing on the part of accountants. At the firm level, policies are more affected if firms seek to use risk management to reduce the volatility of earnings relative to cash flows, are listed on a stock exchange, and have less sophisticated shareholders. We also find that firms significantly reduced the use of non-linear options contracts as a result of the new regulations, but did not significantly change their use of linear derivative contracts.
Finally, firms who state that they sometimes use derivatives to take active positions (speculate) are more likely to be affected by fair value reporting.
Overall, our findings indicate that while fair value reporting rules have reduced speculative activities, sound economic hedging practices have also been adversely affected. If firms were hedging optimally to begin with, the fact that these rule changes affect risk management policies implies a perceived reduction in value. Whether this reduces overall welfare depends on the trade-off between the loss in economically beneficial hedging and the gain from curtailing speculation.
However, given that speculation does not appear to be very prevalent (less than 50% of our sample firms report taking active positions, and most of these do so infrequently), the costs appear to outweigh the benefits. Our results indicate that, from the perspective of an outside shareholder, the economic outcome of the adoption of fair value reporting for derivatives has been nuanced, and that it is important for policy makers to carefully consider the way well-intentioned managers may respond to changes in reporting rules and how the institutions prevalent in a country may shape these responses.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief background on financial reporting for derivatives and discusses the literature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 introduces the survey and provides summary statistics. Section 5 contains the empirical results and Section 6 concludes. A brief Appendix with details on fair value reporting for derivatives follows the concluding section.
Fair Value Reporting of Derivatives and Literature Review
Prior to the introduction of fair value reporting requirements, many derivatives remained unrecorded in the financial statements until maturity because they had negligible or zero historical Fair value reporting of derivatives was widely opposed by companies who argued that the rules were both exceedingly complicated to implement and that their implementation would lead to increased earnings and/or balance sheet volatility. Revsine, Collins, and Johnson (2002) suggest that "…this may force managers to choose between achieving sound economic results -meaning hedges that effectively address real financial risks -or minimizing accounting volatility using risk management approaches that are less efficient or simply not prudent (p 545)."
The extent to which earnings volatility is affected depends on whether the derivative position qualifies for "hedge accounting". Under hedge accounting, if the derivative is fully effective (which implies that the value of the hedging instrument and the underlying exposure move perfectly together)
there is no effect on net income; if it is not fully effective, however, the ineffective portion of the derivative gain or loss must be included in net income. To achieve hedge accounting status, firms have to show that the derivative is designed to offset an underlying economic exposure, and that the hedge is highly effective, which implies that exposure and the value of the hedging instrument are highly correlated.
Many firms, however, employ economically effective hedging strategies which are designed such that the derivative instrument's value and the underlying exposure are not highly correlated. For example, Brown and Toft (2002) show that it is often optimal for a firm to hedge using derivative strategies such as basic or exotic option contracts that feature non-linear payoffs. While it is possible to specify a risk exposure as one-sided, it may be more difficult to show that the price of the option is sufficiently correlated with the price of the underlying exposure so that the derivative position qualifies for hedge accounting. Further, even a carefully designated one-sided derivative position will have uncertainty as to whether an auditor will deem that it qualifies for hedge accounting. Absent hedge accounting status, the entire change in a derivative's value appears in the income statement.
The academic literature assessing the economic effect of fair value reporting on firms' risk management and speculative activities is inconclusive. While Melumad, Weyns, and Ziv (1999) argue that fair value recognition of derivatives makes the use of derivatives more transparent and encourages prudent risk management, DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) , Sapra (2002) and Sapra and Shin (2008) show theoretically that more transparency may distort firms' hedging decisions.
Only a few papers conduct empirical tests on the economic effect of fair value reporting, and such work has to date been limited to U.S. firms. Singh (2004) finds no changes in earnings or cash flow volatilities or the notional amount of derivatives after the adoption of SFAS 133. In contrast, Zhang (2009) finds that the volatility of cash flows for "speculators", defined as a new derivative user whose risk exposures do not decrease after the initiation of a derivatives program, decreases after the introduction of SFAS 133. She interprets this result as evidence that fair value reporting has reduced speculation and led to more prudent risk management activities.
One can argue, however, that the conclusions in Zhang (2009) should be interpreted with caution because it is not possible using archival data to determine with much confidence whether a firm uses derivatives to hedge or to speculate (see Geczy et al. (2007) ) and because her research design removes companies with longstanding hedging programs from the analyses. More important for our research question is the fact that the detailed disclosures of derivatives usage employed by Zhang do not exist for a large number of countries around the world. Thus, the only reliable way to determine whether a global sample of firms engages in hedging using derivatives is to directly ask the managers of such firms. Our paper's research design featuring survey data allows us to conduct the first empirical tests of whether the economic impact of fair value derivatives reporting differs based on country-level institutions and whether firms are publicly traded or private.
Development of Hypotheses
Which firms are likely to be most affected by fair value reporting?
Fair value reporting imposes direct costs because it is complicated to implement.
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We predict that firms are more likely to be affected by fair value reporting if they are more prone to write contracts based on financial statement numbers. Prior studies have identified several factors that affect the extent to which accounting numbers are used for contracting purposes; we expect these factors to also determine whether a company is affected by fair value reporting for derivatives. Some of these factors are firm-specific while others are country-specific.
Additionally, many companies are concerned about investors' perceptions of increased earnings and/or balance sheet volatility. While the direct costs are clearly important, the potential impact of indirect costs is more nuanced and is likely to vary widely across firms.
3 Some indication of the complexity of implementing the standards is provided by the number of restatements due to improper use of hedge accounting. In 2005, a total of 57 US firms restated their accounts because some aspects of hedge accounting had not been properly applied. Among them is General Electric, which claims to have 40 people working full-time to ensure the adequacy of its hedge accounting [CFO Magazine (2006) ].
The most relevant firm-specific factors are their public vs. private status and their size. Ball and Shivakumar (2005), for example, argue that the demand for public financial information is greater for public firms than private firms. In private companies shareholders take a more active role in management than in public companies, which reduces their reliance on financial statements to monitor managers. In contrast, in public companies financial statement information is often used to monitor managers [see also Ke, Petroni, and Safieddine (1999) ]. Similar arguments apply to firm size. Lang and Lundholm (1993) , for example, argue that larger firms have a greater demand for information about them and thus produce greater information compared to smaller firms. Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) take this premise to international data and find that firm size is an important variable for financial transparency across a wide range of countries. Thus, we expect larger and public firms to be more affected by fair value reporting.
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As mentioned above, country specific factors are also likely to affect the extent to which a firm is affected by fair value reporting. Higher financial reporting quality is associated with countrylevel institutional parameters such as disclosure levels, the enforcement of securities laws, and overall investor protection (see, for example, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) , and Bushman and Piotroski (2006) ). Further, across countries, Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) argue that even if companies have similar accounting standards, financial reporting quality will still be affected by incentives of managers and auditors, and these are likely to be determined by the institutions present in a country.
Thus, we expect the effect of fair value reporting to be larger for firms operating in countries with better reporting quality and better enforcement, making financial statements more reliable and thus more likely to be used for contracting purposes.
We also predict that firms that perceive earnings stabilization to be a major benefit of engaging in risk management to be more affected by fair value reporting. Such firms fall in three non-mutually exclusive groups: (a) firms that have written contracts based on earnings (as discussed previously); (b) firms whose investors rely on earnings measures to assess economic performance; (c) firms that care about earnings volatility for other reasons. We now elaborate on groups (b) and (c).
Increased earnings volatility may impact the way investors form opinions about a firm's value in a setting with less than perfect information. Barry and Brown (1985) suggest that the cost of capital is a function of "estimation risk" and the better investors are able to assess the prospects of a company, the lower is its expected cost of capital. This argument suggests that disclosing more information by marking hedges to market is actually a good thing, because it would reduce estimation risk. However, if investors are not sophisticated and rely on reported earnings to estimate underlying economic performance, then their assessments of performance could be impaired when derivatives are marked to market and the change in value is recorded in the income statement.
The lack of investor sophistication is not a necessary ingredient to make investors worse off when derivatives positions are disclosed. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) show theoretically that if hedges are not disclosed in detail, managers may be more willing to hedge. If investors use profits to infer managerial quality and determine compensation, reporting gains/losses from hedges separately makes profits more informative; however, this increases the volatility of managerial compensation, which is to the detriment of risk averse managers. They may therefore decide not to hedge at all.
Research also shows that the stock market rewards firms with increasing earnings patterns [Barth, Elliott, and Finn (1999) ], which provides an incentive for managers to shy away from volatile earnings paths [DeFond and Park (1997) ]. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) survey U.S. and
Canadian firms and report that 96.9% of CFOs surveyed prefer a smooth earnings path and that 78%
of CFOs would sacrifice a small, moderate, or large amount of value to achieve a smoother earnings path. Given this aggregate body of work regarding smooth earnings, it is not surprising that managers who may not be opposed to disclosing their derivative positions per se will be opposed to standards under which such a disclosure causes increased earnings volatility.
Finally, we predict that firms that take active positions (entering into a derivative contract without underlying exposure) are also more affected by fair value reporting. If managers use derivatives to express a view on future price movements instead of hedging underlying exposures, it is likely that fair value reporting will shed more light on these activities. Geczy et al. (2007) use survey evidence to show that forty percent of U.S. firms that use derivatives took an active position based on their market view of interest or exchange rates at least once, and seven percent did so frequently. They conclude that managers are not taking extreme bets with such active positions, however. We ask a similar question in our paper and, as we document later, close to 50% of our global survey respondents report using derivatives so that they can actively take a market view on underlying economic variables at least some of the time. We expect such firms to be more affected by fair value reporting.
Which types of hedges and instruments are likely to be affected?
Derivative positions only qualify for hedge accounting if the hedges are deemed to be highly effective. As discussed previously, it is more difficult to obtain this classification for options contracts. Thus, we expect a reduction in the use of non-linear contracts after the adoption of fair value reporting.
In terms of types of hedges, option contracts are much more suitable to hedge anticipated transactions, because they allow the owner of the option to walk away if the transaction does not happen. We therefore expect hedges of anticipated transactions to decline. Linear contracts are also less likely to qualify for hedge accounting if there is uncertainty about the quantity being hedged (for example, it is difficult to predict the level of foreign profits before the fiscal year-end). We also expect such hedges to decline.
Finally, to obtain hedge accounting, firms need to identify specific cash flows or securities that are being hedged. If firms hedge their economic exposure by netting off a number of exposures and/or by taking into account indirect exposures (e.g., import competition), such hedges will not qualify for hedge accounting. We therefore expect a reduction in these types of hedges as well.
Which firms are likely to be concerned about achieving hedge accounting?
We also study whether qualifying for hedge accounting is important for firms when they consider risk management alternatives. We believe that the factors that determine whether a firm is affected by fair value reporting also determine whether firms are concerned about achieving hedge accounting, except for a firm's tendency to take active positions. Hence, we expect firms that are more likely to write earnings-based contracts, firms that care about earnings volatility per se, and firms with relatively unsophisticated investors to be more interested in getting hedge accounting treatment for derivatives.
Survey Design and Sample
Our data come from a 2005 survey of Chief Financial Officers covering publicly traded and privately owned firms from all over the world. This survey was conducted in collaboration with Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. Prior to launching the survey, it was tested with an initial group of global CFOs to verify that the interpretations we gave to the questions and responses corresponded to their interpretations. The survey was then altered to reflect feedback from this beta testing period.
The survey was administered over the internet and made use of conditional branching (i.e., certain responses led to detailed additional questions, while others did not). The survey was completely anonymous. CFOs received a request from the academic researchers and the Deutsche Bank relationship officers covering the companies were requested to encourage firms to complete the survey, but the bankers did not have access to individual firm responses.
In total, the survey was sent to approximately 4000 firms in 48 countries. These are all firms worldwide that had a coverage officer assigned to them by the investment banking division of Deutsche Bank. This sample comprises the largest companies in their respective countries and industries. It does not include smaller firms in the bank's home market, because those are covered by local branches. A large fraction of the targeted firms were not Deutsche Bank clients at the time. Our initial sample consists of a subset of the 354 responding firms because not all the companies were asked and/or answered all the questions relevant for this study. The first step we take in the sample selection process is to identify how many of the respondents engage in risk management activities. The survey instrument asks firms basic questions regarding their risk management/exposure to three areas of risk that are frequently hedged. It asks a) whether a firm engages in foreign exchange risk management activities, b) whether it engages in interest rate risk management activities, and c) whether, in the absence of risk management activities, the firm would have any material commodity exposures.
Companies were not required to complete every section of the survey.
Executives from 354 firms answered some part of the survey. In terms of the response rate and number of respondents, our survey is similar to the U.S. and Canadian firm CFO survey conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001) , who had a final sample of 392 respondents and a response rate of about 9%. It also similar to the 8% response rate obtained by Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) and Graham et al. (2005) for the portion of their survey of U.S. and Canadian firm CFOs that was conducted via email rather than in person at a conference gathering.
The number and fraction of firms that answered "yes" to each of these questions are reported in the first three rows of Table 1 . The number of respondents varies with the area of risk from 248 to 253 but, in total, 263 firms answered at least one of these questions. Responses to these questions are presented in Table 2 . In total, of the 239 firms that reported management of or exposure to at least one type of risk (Table 1) , 229 firms answered at least one of the questions regarding whether their risk management policies have been affected by the fair value reporting requirements. Thus, the vast majority of respondents that engage in risk management activities also indicated whether or not they were affected by fair value reporting. This alleviates any concern that affected firms might be more likely to respond to this question. Going forward, the paper focuses on the 229 firms that indicate whether or not their risk management policies have been affected by fair value reporting, as this question relates to our main hypotheses. These firms therefore constitute our final sample.
Panel B of Table 2 contains the distribution of the responses regarding the importance of qualifying for hedge accounting. Only affected firms were asked this question. The vast majority of companies consider it very important to qualify for hedge accounting: about 80% of the firms fall in the highest two categories for all three areas of risk management. Table 3 contains data on the country of origin for the firms in our sample. About 56% of the respondents come from Europe, and just over one-fourth of our sample firms come from Asia and Australia/New Zealand. The countries with the largest representation are Germany, the U.S., and Japan. Finally, 4 firms did not disclose their country (these firms will obviously be eliminated from any analyses that involve country-level parameters).
In Table 4 , we report summary statistics for a variety of characteristics of the sample firms.
They have mean revenues of about $7.7 billion and median revenues of $2 billion. Thus, they are larger than the U.S. and Canadian firms studied by Graham et al. (2005) which have median revenues of about $1 billion. A unique feature of our sample, as shown in the second row of Table 4 , is that one-third of the firms are not listed on a stock market. The third row reports the extent to which "reduce the volatility of earnings (without affecting cash flows)" was rated as an important benefit of a successful risk management program. The sample firms consider the pure reduction of earnings volatility to be relatively important, with an average score of 2.6 on a scale from 0 (not important) to 5 (very important). The next row shows that firms are not likely to take active positions (speculate).
Firms were asked whether their view on Foreign Exchange Rates, Interest Rates, or Commodity
Prices causes them to actively take positions in a given market. This question was asked for each area of risk management separately and the response is first averaged across all risk management areas within the firm and then averaged across all firms. On a scale from 0 to 5, where 0 is never and 5 is frequently, the average response is only 0.74. Nevertheless, close to 50% of the respondents indicate that they take active positions at least some of the time (not reported in the table).
The next row in Table 4 shows that sample firms have average institutional ownership of approximately 32%, with a median of 17.5%. Note, however, that firms were not asked to provide an exact measure of institutional ownership. Instead, they were given categories (0%, 1-5%, 6-10%, 11-25%, 26-50%, and over 50%) and the figures reported in the table are computed based on the assumption that each firm has ownership at the category mean. Firms were also asked to report the extent to which "difficulty in explaining to investors" is a substantial drawback of a Risk Management program. The second-to-last row of Table 4 shows that sample firms consider the difficulty of explaining their risk management program to investors to be a moderately important drawback, with an average score of 1.44 on a scale from 0 (not important) to 5 (very important).
Results
Differences between affected and unaffected firms
We start by dividing the sample into two groups of firms: firms whose risk management policies are not affected by fair value reporting and firms whose policies are affected for at least one of the three risks. We then compare means and median across the subsamples along various characteristics. The findings are reported in Table 5 . There are substantial differences between affected and unaffected firms, consistent with the hypotheses proposed in Section 3. First, we find that affected firms are much larger than unaffected firms: median revenues for affected firms are $2.57 billion versus $1.58 billion for unaffected firms. Unaffected firms are also more likely to be private (38%) than affected firms (23%).
To study financial reporting quality at the country level, we rely on the CIFAR score reported in Bushman et al. (2004) . This score is an index based on the inclusion or omission of 90 data items in the financial statements. We divide firms into two groups depending on whether the CIFAR score for their country of domicile is above or below the sample median of 71. As illustrated in Table 5 , affected firms are much more likely to be domiciled in countries with high financial reporting quality.
The second country-level variable focuses on the legal liabilities of accountants in case of misrepresentation. We employ the burden of proof for accountants variable developed by La Porta, -de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) . This variable captures how difficult it is to prove liability due to misleading statements by accountants. We split the sample into two groups depending on whether the burden of proof in a firm's country of domicile is low (≤ 0.5) or high (> 0.5). Table 5 shows that the burden of proof is much more likely to be low for affected firms (73%) than for unaffected firms (59%).
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We do not find any differences between affected and unaffected firms in the level of institutional ownership, which provides no evidence for the investor sophistication argument. We also employ another proxy for sophistication: the extent to which difficulty in explaining risk management policies to investors is a substantial drawback of a risk management program. Table 5 illustrates that the difficulty in explaining their risk management policies to investors is more of a drawback for affected firms. While the mean difficulty score is low for both sets of firms, the mean score is 1.68 for affected firms and 1.28 for unaffected firms; the difference between the two is significant at the 2% level. Taken together, the univariate analyses provide mixed support for the investor sophistication argument.
Next we study the importance of reducing earnings volatility (without necessarily affecting cash flows) as a perceived benefit of risk management. While this question does not allow us to identify why firms want to reduce earnings volatility through hedging, it does allow us to study whether firms who rely on hedging to reduce earnings volatility are more affected by fair value reporting. This is indeed the case: affected firms find that reducing earnings volatility is a more important benefit (score = 3.36) than unaffected firms (score = 2.78).
Finally, we investigate whether affected firms are more likely to take active positions, and find that this is the case, albeit that both sets of firms have a low score. While this suggests that affected firms are more likely to take active positions, they generally do not do so frequently.
Overall, the univariate analyses provide substantial support for the hypotheses proposed in this paper.
Which factors determine whether firms are affected by fair value reporting?
We now turn to a multivariate analysis to study the factors that determine whether firms are affected by the fair value reporting requirements. Two different methods are employed to investigate this issue.
In the first approach we treat each firm's response to each risk management area as a separate observation. Thus, a firm that responded to all three areas is included three times in our analysis. We then estimate various probit models to explain whether or not a firm's specific policy is affected or not. While most explanatory variables are measured at the firm or country level, the survey asks whether firms would ever take active positions for each risk management area separately, and we employ this information in these models. Because firms potentially enter the models multiple times, we adjust the standard errors to reflect the lack of independence of the observations (standard errors clustered at the firm level). In addition, all standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity.
Panel A of Table 6 contains the findings. We do not have responses on institutional ownership and the importance of reducing earnings volatility for all firms. Instead of discarding firms from models in which these characteristics are employed as explanatory variables, we set them equal to zero when missing, but also include a dummy variable set equal to one if the observation is missing, and zero otherwise.
We present several models. In model (i) of Table 6 , we include only size and financial reporting quality. Both significantly increase the likelihood of being affected by fair value reporting.
We replace financial reporting quality with the burden of proof variable in model (ii). While financial reporting quality only speaks to the level of disclosure, the burden of proof captures an element of enforcement. Since the disclosure and enforcement variables are highly correlated (ρ=0.58, pvalue=0.00), we do not combine them in one model. The regression indicates that firms from countries with a low burden of proof are more likely to be affected. Model (iii) illustrates that private firms are less likely to be affected by fair value reporting. All the proxies employed in these models indicate that firms are more affected when there is a higher likelihood that financial statement data are used for contracting. We combine two of these variables in model (iv) and also control for institutional ownership to proxy for investor sophistication. We find that firms with more sophisticated investors (more institutional ownership) are less affected by fair value reporting.
Finally, in model (v), we add the importance of reducing earnings volatility as a benefit of risk management and the willingness of the firm to take active positions. The positive coefficients on both variables indicate that these features increase the likelihood of being affected.
The economic significance of these findings is presented in Panel B of Table 6 , where we show how the likelihood of being affected by fair value reporting changes as firm characteristics change (based on model (v) of Panel A). We start by considering several base case probabilities for combinations of public and private firms with high and low burdens of proof. For these base cases, we report the probabilities of being affected, given that all other explanatory variables are set at their means. For example, the likelihood of a private (public) firm with a high burden of proof being affected is 13.4% (24.6%), while the same likelihood is 23.2% (37.8%) for a private (public) firm with a low burden of proof. These differences illustrate that the effects of burden of proof and listing status are also economically large. Subsequent columns highlight the economic significance of the other variables. They show what happens to the base case probabilities when the continuous explanatory variables increase by one standard deviation, while the other explanatory variables remain at the means. For example, when log(revenues) increases by one standard deviation, the likelihood that a public firm with a low burden of proof is affected increases by 7.67% from its base case of 37.8%. The changes in probabilities are large for all explanatory variables. This indicates that our findings are not only statistically, but also economically significant.
We also employ a second estimation approach to examine the types of firms that are more affected by fair value reporting. This approach treats each firm as an individual observation. The dependent variable in these models is the affected variable as described in Table 2 . Affected is the proportion of the three areas of risk management affected by fair value reporting. It takes on the values of 0, 0.333, 0.5, 0.666, or 1.
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Our findings, reported in Table 7 , are very similar to those contained in Panel A of Table 6 .
Risk management policies are more affected in countries with high financial reporting quality and a low burden of proof for accountant misdeeds and for firms that consider earnings volatility reduction to be an important benefit of risk management or that take active positions, while private firms remain less affected. Only institutional ownership is no longer statistically significant. We also conduct an analysis of the economic importance of the results using the same approach as in Panel B of Table 6 , and again find that the documented effects are economically meaningful (not tabulated for brevity).
While firms with a score of 0.5 are more affected than those with score of 0.333, it is not clear that we should interpret a score of 0.5 to imply that the effect is truly 50% larger than for firms with a score of 0.333. We therefore estimate ordered probit models, in which the exact magnitude of the variables is ignored, but higher numbers imply that the firm is more affected.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section provides strong support for our hypotheses.
The effect of the new reporting requirements on risk management varies cross-sectionally with financial reporting quality, enforcement, speculation, and the extent to which firms manage risk to reduce earnings volatility.
The effect of fair value reporting on instrument use
In this section we analyze the affected firms in more detail to find out how their use of instruments changes as a result of firm value reporting. Table 8 contains the results. Affected firms were asked to describe whether they would increase or decrease their reliance on specific instruments as a result of fair value reporting. This question was asked three times, once for each area of risk management; the list of instruments was always the same, except that debt in a foreign currency was offered only as an option in the foreign exchange section, and forward rate agreements was an option only in the interest rate section. In our analysis, we treat each response as a separate observation. Thus, if a firm provides a response in each area of risk management, it would be counted three times. However, when computing the t-statistics to assess whether the use of a particular instrument has been reduced, we take into account the lack of independence of the observations. We also report statistics after combining all linear (forward contracts, forward rate agreements, futures contracts, swaps, and foreign currency debt) and all nonlinear contracts (options on futures, OTC options, and exchange traded options). Table 8 shows that there is a clear difference across instruments in the effect of fair value reporting. Linear instruments are generally unaffected, except for a decline in the use of futures contracts. This lack of an effect is not surprising because it may be easier to qualify for hedge accounting with linear instruments. The decline in the use of options is quite dramatic, however. For example, almost 45% of the firms decrease their reliance on OTC options as a result of the standards.
Hedges with option contracts are generally less likely to qualify for hedge accounting and these findings suggest that their use declined substantially. Given that hedging strategies with non-linear payoffs are often optimal [see Brown and Toft (2002) ], this outcome appears undesirable. 8 8 Participants were also asked how fair value reporting affected various foreign exchange hedging activities. We find that all foreign exchange hedging activities are reduced, except for hedges of accounts receivable, accounts payable and balance sheet book values. These types of hedges are the most likely to qualify for hedge accounting because there is little uncertainty about the amounts involved. For sake of brevity, we do not report these findings in a table, but they are available from the authors upon request.
The importance of qualifying for hedge accounting
As mentioned in Section 3 and documented in Panel B of Table 2 , the survey also asks affected firms their opinion about how important it is to qualify for hedge accounting when considering risk management alternatives (on a scale from 0=not important to 5=very important). In this section, we study what determines the cross-sectional variability in the response to this question.
We expect the factors determining the importance of qualifying for hedge accounting to be the same as the factors explaining whether firms are affected by fair value reporting, with one exception: we do not expect firms that take active positions to be more concerned with achieving hedge accounting when evaluating risk management solutions. Taking a view has nothing to do with risk management as such.
Because the responses are categorical, we estimate ordered probit models. We treat each firm response to each risk management area as an individual observation, so the same firm may enter the regression multiple times, but we adjust the standard errors for the lack of independence of the observations (standard errors are clustered at the firm level). Table 9 contains the findings. The regression models are displayed in Panel A, while Panel B analyzes the economic significance. As these answers are only available for firms whose risk management policies have been affected by fair value reporting, the findings should be interpreted with caution given the smaller sample size.
In model (i), we study size and financial reporting quality. Both variables are insignificant.
In model (ii) we replace financial reporting quality with the low burden of proof dummy; this variable is significantly positive, suggesting that firms in countries where it easier to prove accountant wrongdoings care more about achieving hedge accounting. In model (iii), we find evidence that private firms are less concerned with hedge accounting. We combine several explanatory variables in model (iv). We continue to find a positive effect for low burden of proof and a negative effect for private firms. Institutional ownership is not significant, however, which suggests that investor sophistication is not an important driver of the desire to qualify for hedge accounting. Finally, model (v) shows that firms that consider earnings volatility reduction to be important care more about achieving hedge accounting. In this model, size, the burden of proof, and the private company dummy are all significant at the 10% level or better. These findings broadly support our predictions, with the exception of the role of investor sophistication.
Panel B of Table 9 contains an analysis of the economic significance of these findings, based on model (v). We again start by identifying two base cases: private firms with high burden of proof and public firms with low burden of proof. We then compute the probability of various responses to the question: how important is it to qualify for hedge accounting. Recall that six categories were possible, ranging from 0 (not important) to 5 (very important). We pick three of these categoriesthe two extremes and one in the middle -and compute the probability that firms from the two base cases we have identified fall into each of these categories, assuming that the other explanatory variables are set equal to the mean. As illustrated in column (iii), the base case probabilities differ substantially between the two sets of firms. For example, only 17% of private firms with a high burden of proof fall in category 5, while 55.5% of public firms with a low burden of proof fall in that category. In columns (iv) and (v), we illustrate what happens to these probabilities when we switch the indicator variables. The changes in probabilities are quite substantial. For example, the 55.5%
probability we just discussed declines by 22.5% when we move the firm from public to private status.
Finally, in columns (vi) to (viii), we report the change in probability when one of the continuous variables increases by one standard deviation. For instance, the 55.5% probability increases by 20.7% if the importance of reducing earnings volatility increases by one standard deviation.
The computations in Panel B of Table 9 illustrate that the results that are statistically significant also have a very large economic impact.
Robustness tests
We conduct three sets of tests to verify that the findings reported previously are robust. First, we include dummy variables for all countries with more than 5 respondent firms in our sample to make sure the explanatory variables employed in our analyses are not proxying for country characteristics. When estimating models with the inclusion of these dummies, we remove the country level variables from the regressions. Inclusion of these dummies does not affect our findings.
Second, we include dummies for 18 broad industry classifications from which respondents could choose when completing the survey. None of these dummies are significant at conventional levels.
Moreover, their inclusion does not affect the other findings reported previously. Third, not all firms implemented FAS 133, IAS 39 or their local equivalent at the same time. Some firms implemented the standards as early 1998 while others were required to adopt it in or after 2005, the year in which the survey took place. Experience with fair value reporting may have two effects: (a) over time, firms may change their opinion about the indirect costs associated with the standards, and their effect on risk management policies; and (b) firms that adopted the standards several years before the survey was conducted may not remember its exact impact. This second effect would only add noise to the data, making it more difficult to uncover cross-sectional differences in responses. To study the first effect, we include in our regressions the number of years since the adoption of fair value reporting as an additional control variable. It is never significantly different from zero and its inclusion does not affect the significance of the other findings.
Limitations of the study and discussion
Our study has a number of limitations. First, only firms that were engaged in risk management activities when the survey was conducted (2005) were asked about the effect of fair value reporting. Hence, our sample does not include firms (if any) that stopped using derivatives to manage risk in response to the standard before 2005, which may understate the effect of fair value reporting. Thus, our results provide a conservative estimate of the impact of fair value reporting on risk management.
Second, as in any survey, there could be some concerns about the respondents' understanding of the questions. We are confident that the survey questions were generally well understood because it was both beta tested in advance and, after completion, the survey findings were presented at several practitioner seminars where participants again confirmed their understanding of the questions.
Additionally, the fact that we uncover relationships between the survey responses and firm characteristics that are economically meaningful is evidence against the notion that the responses are just noise.
Third, there could also be concerns about response biases and sample selection bias in general.
We find no differences in industry composition between respondents and non-respondents, but the firms responding to the risk management part of the survey are significantly larger. This size effect is not surprising, however, as prior work indicates that large firms are more likely to manage risk [see,
for example, Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) ].
A final concern is that respondents decide not to answer questions truthfully. As our survey is completely anonymous, we do not believe there would be any reason for respondents to answer questions in anything other than a truthful manner. Moreover, as pointed out by Graham and Harvey (2001) and Lins et al. (2010) , it is not clear why corporate executives would take the time to respond to a lengthy survey if their intent was to be untruthful.
Overall, we believe that the benefits of this survey-based study outweigh the above limitations. Unlike studies that employ archival data to draw inferences about the effect of fair value reporting, we are able to: (a) distinguish more precisely between speculators and hedgers; (b) study the effect of fair value reporting on large companies with established risk management programmes in place, rather than new users. These are in fact the companies that raised more concerns about the standards and that are likely to engage in the bulk of all corporate risk management activities; (c)
investigate in detail what types of activities and instruments have been affected. This cannot be done by studying changes in cash flows and earnings volatilities; (d) shed some light on the importance of qualifying for hedge accounting when firms consider risk management alternatives.
Conclusion
This paper employs survey evidence to study the impact of fair value reporting of derivatives on the risk management policies of companies worldwide. We show that fair value reporting has a substantial impact on risk management policies: forty-two percent of all companies have been affected by fair value reporting requirements in at least one area of risk management. Many of those that have been affected indicate that their ability to hedge from an economic perspective has been compromised. However, we also find that the reporting requirements have reduced the use of derivatives for speculative purposes: firms that are more likely to take active positions are more likely to be affected by the standards. In terms of instruments, we observe that firms are less likely to employ strategies that involve securities with non-linear payoffs (which are less likely to qualify for hedge accounting), while there is little or no decline in the use of linear instruments.
We also document cross-sectional differences in the extent to which companies have been affected by fair value reporting and care about qualifying for hedge accounting. Firms that operate in an environment where contracts are more likely to be written on financial statement numbers, and firms that attach more importance to the reduction of earnings volatility as a benefit of risk management are more affected and care more about obtaining hedge accounting. Affected firms also have less sophisticated investors. Financial reporting quality at the country-level, and particularly the ability to take accountants to court, also has a dramatic impact on the effect of fair value reporting on corporate risk management activities.
While our analyses of the survey evidence shed light on the types of firms being affected and the changes in their risk management policies, we are not in a position to evaluate the overall welfare impact of fair value reporting. This depends on whether the cost of the decline in economic hedging is outweighed by the benefit (if any) of the reduction in speculation, or other benefits of increased disclosure. What is clear is that fair value reporting requirements are not innocuous and can have a substantial impact on the behavior of companies. The implementation of fair value reporting standards has been met with protest and controversy, centered around two issues. First, the standards are complicated to implement. In fact, SFAS 133 is the only standard for which the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) created an implementation group, the Derivatives Implementation Group (DIG), to address implementation questions raised by companies. The difficulty in implementing these standards has also been acknowledged by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), which is currently revising IAS 39 in an attempt to reduce its complexity. Second, when the standards were proposed, many companies argued against their adoption because their implementation would lead to increased earnings and/or balance sheet volatility.
The extent to which earnings volatility is affected depends on whether the derivative position qualifies for "hedge accounting". Under hedge accounting, if the derivative is fully effective as a hedge there is no effect on net income; changes in the value of the derivative either (i) bypass the income statement and are reported in other comprehensive income (for cash flow hedges) or (ii) are reported in net income but are perfectly offset by the changes in the value of the underlying exposure (for fair value hedges). 9 9 Cash flow hedges are intended to mitigate the volatility of future cash flows while fair value hedges are intended to mitigate changes in the fair value of recognized assets or liabilities.
If the hedge is not fully effective, however, net income is affected because the ineffective portion of the derivative gain or loss must be included in net income. To achieve hedge accounting status, firms have to show that the derivative is designed to offset an underlying economic exposure, and that the hedge is highly effective, which implies that the value of the hedging instrument and the underlying exposure are highly correlated.
Table 1 Number of firms that answered questions regarding risk management/exposure
This table lists the number of firms that indicate whether they manage foreign exchange and interest rate risk and whether, in the absence of risk management, they have commodity exposure. We list the number of firms responding to the question and the number of firms managing the risk or exposed to commodities. The fourth row lists the number of firms with at least one exposure. Only firms who respond whether at least one of their risk management policies has been or will be affected by fair value reporting are included in the sample. Firms are asked to indicate in which category institutional ownership falls: 0%, 1-5%, 6-10%, 11%-25% 26-50%, 51% or more. The average and medians in this table are computed based on the assumption that each firm in a category has institutional ownership equal to the category average. High financial reporting quality is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is domiciled in a country with an index of disclosure quality (CIFAR score) equal to 71 and above and zero otherwise. Low burden of proof is a dummy variable set equal to one if the burden of proof for accountants index developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) is bigger than 0.5 and zero otherwise. Survey respondents indicate whether institutional ownership falls in one of the following categories: 0%, 1%-5%, 6%-10%, 11%-25%, 26%-50%, 51% or more. We assume that ownership in each category is equal to the category average before computing sample means and medians. P-value means is the pvalue of a t-test of equality of means of the two groups. P-value medians is the p-value of a rank sum test of equality of medians of the two groups. In Panel A, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a specific risk management area for a firm has been affected by fair value reporting and zero otherwise. Each firm response for each risk management area is considered to be a separate observation. Three areas of risk management are considered: foreign exchange, interest rate, and commodities. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect the lack of independence of the observations. High financial reporting quality is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is domiciled in a country with an index of disclosure quality (CIFAR score) equal to 71 and above and zero otherwise. Low burden of proof is a dummy variable set equal to one if the burden of proof for accountants index developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) is bigger than 0.5 and zero otherwise. Survey respondents indicate whether institutional ownership falls in one of the following categories: 0%, 1%-5%, 6%-10%, 11%-25%, 26%-50%, 51% or more. We assume that ownership in each category is equal to the category average before computing sample means and medians. Revenues, institutional ownership, and the importance of reducing earnings volatility are measured at the firm level. High financial reporting quality and low burden of proof are measured at the country level. Active positions is measured for each firm and for each area of risk management separately. When institutional ownership and the importance of reducing earnings volatility are missing, we set these variables equal to zero. Dummy variables are set equal to one of these variables are missing and zero otherwise. The coefficients on the dummy variables are not reported in the table. P-values are in parentheses. Panel B presents the marginal effects of changing the independent variables. The base case probabilities are calculated using the coefficients of model (v) in Panel A, and setting the continuous independent variables equal to their mean values. In the base case scenario, the dummy variables are set equal to 0 or 1 depending on the base case (first two columns). We re-calculate the effect on each of these probabilities of an increase of one standard deviation in each of the continuous independent variables. Column (ii) reports the base case probabilities while columns (iii) to (vi) report the change in probabilities. The dependent variable is Affected, which is the fraction of each firm's risk management policies affected by fair value reporting. Three areas of risk management are considered: foreign exchange, interest rate, and commodities. Independent variables are the same as those described in Table  6 except that Active positions is measured for each firm by averaging the response for each area of risk management separately. P-values are in parentheses.
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Log ( Table 8 The impact of new reporting standards on the instruments being used Table 9 Ordered probit regressions explaining the importance of qualifying for hedge accounting when considering risk management alternatives
In Panel A, the dependent variable is Importance_of_Hedge, which summarizes firms' opinion about how important is to qualify for hedge accounting when considering risk management alternatives (on scale from 0=not important to 5=very important). Each firm response for each risk management area is considered to be a separate observation. Three areas of risk management are considered: foreign exchange, interest rate, and commodities. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect the lack of independence of the observations. High financial reporting quality is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is domiciled in a country with an index of disclosure quality (CIFAR score) equal to 71 and above and zero otherwise. Low burden of proof is a dummy variable set equal to one if the burden of proof for accountants index developed by La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) is bigger than 0.5 and zero otherwise. Survey respondents indicate whether institutional ownership falls in one of the following categories: 0%, 1%-5%, 6%-10%, 11%-25%, 26%-50%, 51% or more. We assume that ownership in each category is equal to the category average before computing sample means and medians. Revenues, institutional ownership, and the importance of reducing earnings volatility are measured at the firm level. High financial reporting quality and low burden of proof are measured at the country level. When institutional ownership and the importance of reducing earnings volatility are missing, we set these variables equal to zero. Dummy variables are set equal to one of these variables are missing and zero otherwise. The coefficients on the dummy variables are not reported in the table. P-values are in parentheses. Panel B presents the marginal effects of changing the independent variables. The base case probabilities are calculated using the coefficients of model (v) in Panel A, and setting the continuous independent variables equal to their mean values. In the base case scenario, the dummy variables are set equal to 0 or 1 depending on the base case (first column). We re-calculate these probabilities changing one independent variable at a time. Continuous independent variables are increased by one standard deviation and the dummy variables are changed from 0 to 1, or from 1 to 0, depending on the case. Column (iii) reports the base case probabilities while columns (iv) to (viii) report the change in probabilities. 
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